A Stochastic Logic for Mobility and Global Computing

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Many concepts and ideas presented here are based on results on formal modeling and analysis of stochastic aspects of system behaviour achieved in the last few years by many colleagues and friends, a.o.:

- C. Baier et al. (Tec. Univ. of Dresden, D);
- M. Bravetti et al. (Univ. Bologna, IT);
- R. Gorrieri et al. (Univ. of Bologna, IT);
- B. Haverkort et al. (Univ. of Twente, NL);
- H. Hermanns (Univ. of Saarbruecken, D);
- J. Hillston et al. (Univ. of Edinburg, UK);
- J.P. Katoen et al. (Univ. of Aachen, D);
- M. Kwiatkowska et al. (Univ. of Birmingham, UK);
- K. Larsen et al. (Aalborg Univ.);
- C. Priami et al. (Univ. of Trento);
- S. Smolka et al. (SUNY)
- ... and many others!

AGILE and SENSORIA

The focus on GC and SOC is the subject of cooperative work in the context of the EU Projects



• M. Massink (CNR/ISTI, Pisa)

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• STOKLAIM in one slide;

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- O STOKLAIM in one slide;
- \bigcirc MoSL: General;

- $\textcircled{O} STOKLAIM in one slide;}$
- MoSL: General;
- $\textcircled{O} MOSL: \mathsf{Operators}$

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- Example properties (Airbag);
- Oevelopments

D. Latella et al. (CNR/ISTI)

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• System:

Collection of Sites (i.e. physical addresses) with

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Processes running

• System:

Collection of Sites (i.e. physical addresses) with

- Processes running
- Tuples stored.

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- System State (Network snapshot):

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- System State (Network snapshot):

Collection of nodes, each located at a specific site

Processes execute actions

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- Processes execute actions
 - acting on local or remote sites

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 - acting on local or remote sites
 - using logical addresses (locally mapped to physical ones)

• System:

Collection of Sites (i.e. physical addresses) with

- Processes running
- Tuples stored.
- System State (Network snapshot):

- Processes execute actions which take time (exp. dist. r.v.)
 - acting on local or remote sites
 - using logical addresses (locally mapped to physical ones)

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• Processes

$$P ::= \mathsf{nil} \left| (A, \mathbf{r}) \cdot P \right| P + P \left| P \right| X$$

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$$N ::= \mathbf{0} \left| i ::_{\rho} P \right| i ::_{\rho} \langle \vec{f} \rangle \left| N \parallel N \right|$$

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• Stored Tuples
$$\langle f_1, \ldots, f_n \rangle$$
 with $f_j ::= v \mid P$

$\operatorname{StoKLAIM}$ in one (more) slide

• Actions $A ::= \operatorname{newloc}(!u) \left| \operatorname{out}(\vec{f}) @\ell \right| \operatorname{in}(\vec{F}) @\ell \left| \operatorname{read}(\vec{F}) @\ell \right| \operatorname{eval}(P) @\ell$

• Processes

$$P ::= \mathsf{nil} \left| (A, \mathbf{r}) \cdot P \right| P + P \left| P \right| X$$

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$$N ::= \mathbf{0} \left| i ::_{\rho} P \right| i ::_{\rho} \langle \vec{f} \rangle \left| N \parallel N \right|$$

• Stored Tuples
$$\langle f_1, \ldots, f_n \rangle$$
 with $f_j ::= v \mid P$

• Patterns F₁,..., F_n as usual ... • a *temporal logic* (dynamic evolution);

- a temporal logic (dynamic evolution);
- Ø both action- and state-based;

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a real-time logic (real-time bounds);

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- a probabilistic logic (performance and dependability aspects);


- a temporal logic (dynamic evolution);
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- a real-time logic (real-time bounds);
- a probabilistic logic (performance and dependability aspects);
- a *spatial logic* (spatial structure of the network);


- a temporal logic (dynamic evolution);
- Ø both action- and state-based;

- a real-time logic (real-time bounds);
- a probabilistic logic (performance and dependability aspects);
- a spatial logic (spatial structure of the network);
- o a resource-oriented logic (GC open-endedness)

MoSL:General (cont'd)



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MOSL: Atomic propositions

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MOSL: Atomic propositions

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MOSL: Atomic propositions

ℵ ::= tt

$$\aleph$$
 ::= tt | $Q@i$

$$\aleph ::= \mathsf{tt} \mid Q @ \imath \mid \langle \vec{F} \rangle @ \imath$$

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- < A

$$lpha$$
 ::= tt | Q @ i | $\langle \vec{F} \rangle$ @ i

Boot@A (satisfied if process Boot is ready to start at A)

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 \aleph ::= tt | $Q @\imath | \langle \vec{F} \rangle @\imath$.

Boot@A (satisfied if process **Boot** is ready to start at A) $\langle GO \rangle @A$ (satisfied if value GO is stored at A)

MoSL : Action specifiers and action sets

MOSL: Action specifiers and action sets

In CTL

$\Phi \ \mathcal{U} \Psi$

MOSL: Action specifiers and action sets

In aCTL

 $\Phi \mathcal{U}_{0} \Psi$

 Δ, Ω : Sets of actions (uninterpreted, atomic)

MOSL: Action specifiers and action sets

 ${\sf In}\ {\rm MoSL}$

 $\Phi_{\Lambda} \mathcal{U}_{\Omega} \Psi$

 $\Delta, \Omega:$ Sets of action specifiers, to be matched against KLAIM actions

MOSL: Action specifiers and action sets (cont'd)

init : **o**(*GO*, *A*)

Satisfied by any action executed at site *init*, by means of which a process uploads value *GO* to site *A*;

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 $|z_1: \mathbf{o}(GO, |z_2)$

Satisfied by any action, executed at some site (z_1) , by means of which a process uploads value *GO* to some site (z_2) ;

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 \top : satisfied by *any* action.

ACTION SPECIFIER	IS SATISFIED BY
$g_1: o(\vec{F}, g_2)$	any out action, executed at a site i_1 matching g_1 , uploading a tuple \vec{f} matching \vec{F} to a site i_2 matching g_2
$g_1: \iota(ec{F}, g_2)$	any in action, executed at a site i_1 matching g_1 , downloading a tuple \vec{f} matching \vec{F} from a site i_2 matching g_2
$g_1: \mathtt{R}(ec{F}, g_2)$	any read action, executed at a site i_1 matching g_1 , reading a tuple \vec{f} matching \vec{F} from a site i_2 matching g_2
$g_1: E(F, g_2)$	any eval action, executed at a site i_1 matching g_1 , spawning a process P matching F to a site i_2 matching g_2
$g_1: N(g_2)$	any newloc action executed at a site i_1 matching g_1 , creating a node with physical address i_2 matching g_2

 Satisfied by those paths where eventually a Ψ-state is reached, by time t, via a Φ-path, and, in addition, while evolving between Φ states, actions are performed satisfying Δ and the Ψ-state is entered via an action satisfying Ω.

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$$\mathsf{tt}_{\top}\mathcal{U}^{< t}_{\{\mathsf{init}: \mathbf{O}(GO, A)\}} \mathsf{tt} \quad \mathsf{tt}_{\top}\mathcal{U}^{< t}_{\top} \langle GO \rangle @A \quad \mathsf{tt}_{\top}\mathcal{U}^{< \infty}_{\{i_1: \mathbf{N}(!z)\}} \mathsf{nil}@z$$

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$$\Phi ::= \operatorname{tt} |\langle \vec{F} \rangle @\imath | Q @\imath$$

$$\Phi ::= \operatorname{tt} |\langle \vec{F} \rangle @_{i} | Q @_{i}$$
$$\neg \Phi | \Phi \lor \Phi |$$

Image: A math a math

$$\Phi ::= \operatorname{tt} |\langle \vec{F} \rangle @_{i} | Q @_{i} |$$
$$\neg \Phi | \Phi \lor \Phi |$$
$$\langle \vec{F} \rangle @_{i} \to \Phi$$

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$$\Phi ::= \operatorname{tt} |\langle \vec{F} \rangle @_{i} | Q@_{i} |$$
$$\neg \Phi | \Phi \lor \Phi |$$
$$\langle \vec{F} \rangle @_{i} \rightarrow \Phi \text{ consumption}$$

$$\Phi ::= \operatorname{tt} |\langle \vec{F} \rangle @_{i} | Q @_{i} |$$
$$\neg \Phi | \Phi \lor \Phi |$$
$$\langle \vec{F} \rangle @_{i} \rightarrow \Phi | Q @_{i} \rightarrow \Phi$$

Image: Image:

$$\Phi ::= \operatorname{tt} |\langle \vec{F} \rangle @_{i} | Q@_{i} |$$
$$\neg \Phi | \Phi \lor \Phi |$$
$$\langle \vec{F} \rangle @_{i} \rightarrow \Phi | Q@_{i} \rightarrow \Phi |$$
$$\langle \vec{f} \rangle @_{i} \leftarrow \Phi$$

Image: A match a ma

$$\Phi ::= \operatorname{tt} |\langle \vec{F} \rangle @_{i} | Q @_{i} |$$

$$\neg \Phi | \Phi \lor \Phi |$$

$$\langle \vec{F} \rangle @_{i} \to \Phi | Q @_{i} \to \Phi |$$

$$\langle \vec{f} \rangle @_{i} \leftarrow \Phi \text{ production}$$

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$$\begin{array}{lll} \Phi & ::= & \operatorname{tt} \mid \langle \vec{F} \rangle @_{\imath} \mid Q @_{\imath} \mid \\ & \neg \Phi \mid \Phi \lor \Phi \mid \\ & \langle \vec{F} \rangle @_{\imath} \to \Phi \mid Q @_{\imath} \to \Phi \mid \\ & \langle \vec{f} \rangle @_{\imath} \leftarrow \Phi \mid Q @_{\imath} \leftarrow \Phi \end{array}$$

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with $\bowtie \in \{<,>,\leq,\geq\}$ and $p \in [0,1]$

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State Formulae Satisfaction relation

$$s \models \langle \vec{F} \rangle @ \imath \to \Phi \quad \text{iff} \quad s \equiv \imath ::_{\rho} \langle \vec{f} \rangle \parallel s', match(\vec{F}, \vec{f}) = \theta, \text{ and } s' \models \Phi$$

$$s \models \langle \vec{f} \rangle @_i \leftarrow \Phi$$
 iff $s \equiv i ::_{\rho} \mathsf{nil} \parallel s' \mathsf{and} i ::_{\rho} \langle \vec{f} \rangle \parallel s \models \Phi$

$$s \models \mathcal{P}_{\bowtie p}(\varphi)$$
 iff $\mathbf{IP}\{\pi \in \mathsf{Paths}(\mathsf{s}) \mid \pi \models \varphi\} \bowtie p$

$$s \models \mathcal{S}_{\bowtie p}(\Phi) \qquad \text{iff} \quad \textit{lim}_{t \to \infty} \mathsf{IP}\{\pi \in \mathsf{Paths}(\mathsf{s}) \mid \pi[t] \models \Phi\} \bowtie p$$

Path Formulae Satisfaction relation

 $\pi \models \Phi \ _{\Lambda} \mathcal{U}_{\Omega}^{\leq t} \Psi$ if and only if there exists $k, 0 < k \leq \text{len}(\pi)$ s.t.: • $\sum_{i=0}^{k-1} time(\pi, j) < t$ 2 there exists Θ_{k-1} s.t.: **1** state($\pi, k - 1$) $\models \Phi$, 2 act $(\pi, k-1), \Theta_{k-1} \models \Omega$, **3** state(π, k) $\models \Psi \Theta_{k-1}$ • if k > 1 there exist $\Theta_0, \ldots, \Theta_{k-2}$ s.t. for all $j, 0 \le j \le k-2$: • state(π , i) $\models \Phi$. **2** act $(\pi, j), \Theta_i \models \Delta$ $\gamma, \Theta \models \top$ $\gamma, \Theta \models \{\xi_1, \dots, \xi_n\}$ iff there exists $0 < j \le n$ s.t. $\gamma, \Theta \models \xi_i$ $\gamma, \Theta \models \xi \text{ iff match}(\xi, \gamma) = \Theta$

MOSL: Examples

Image: A mathematical states and a mathem

MoSL: Examples

• In the long run, the probability of finding the resource at A free is at least 0.2:

 $\mathcal{S}_{\geq 0.2}(\langle AF \rangle @A)$

MoSL: Examples

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$$\mathcal{S}_{\geq 0.2}(\langle AF \rangle @A)$$

• If, in the current state, there is a request for a *S2*-type service placed on site *A*, the probability that such a request gets served within 72.04 time-units is at least 0.85:

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$$(S2)$$
 @ $A \Rightarrow \mathcal{P}_{\geq 0.85}$ (tt $_{\top}\mathcal{U}^{<72.04}_{\{A:I(S2,A)\}}$ tt)

$$\mathcal{S}_{\geq 0.2}(\langle AF \rangle @A)$$

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$$\langle S2 \rangle @A \Rightarrow \mathcal{P}_{\geq 0.85}(\mathsf{tt}_{\top} \mathcal{U}_{\{A: \mathsf{I}(S2, A)\}}^{<72.04} \mathsf{tt})$$

• In equilibrium, the probability is at least 0.87 that in at least 75% of the cases a *S1*-type request is placed at site *A* within 500 time units:

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• In equilibrium, the probability is at least 0.87 that in at least 75% of the cases a *S1*-type request is placed at site *A* within 500 time units:

$$\mathcal{S}_{\geq 0.87}(\mathcal{P}_{\geq 0.75}(ext{tt}_{\top}\mathcal{U}^{<500}_{\{!z:\mathbf{0}(S1,A)\}} ext{tt}))$$

When an accident occurs to a car registered with the Accident Assistance Service and the airbag of the car deploys, the following happens. First, an automated message is sent to the Accident Assistance Server which contains the vehicle's GPS data, the vehicle identification number and a collection of sensor data. Then, the Accident Assistance Server places a call to the driver's mobile phone. If, due to his injuries, the driver is unable to answer the call, and the severity of the accident is confirmed also by the sensor data, the emergency services are alerted and the vehicle location is communicated to them. Incoming car are alerted as well.

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Simplifications

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• Airabag deployment is not considered.

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- If the driver does not answer the phone call, the emergency services are alerted *anyway*.

Simplifications

- Airabag deployment is not considered.
- If the driver does not answer the phone call, the emergency services are alerted *anyway*.
- Alerting cars which are approaching the accident area not considered.

- Each entity of interest is (assumed modeled as a STOKLAIM site and is) provided with its physical address.
 - Accident Assistance Server address: AccAssSrv,
 - Phone Server address: PhSrv,
 - Emergency Server address: EmSrv,
 - Each car has its own address.

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- Accident notification: storing (CarID, GPSData, SenData) @ AccAssSrv

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- Accident notification: storing (CarID, GPSData, SenData) @ AccAssSrv
- $PhNr : CID \rightarrow PhN; PhNr(carID) = carID$ driver's mobile phone nr.

- Each entity of interest is (assumed modeled as a STOKLAIM site and is) provided with its physical address.
 - Accident Assistance Server address: AccAssSrv,
 - Phone Server address: PhSrv,
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 - Each car has its own address.
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- The Accident Assistance Server alerts the Emergency Server by uploading the GPS data to site *EmSrv*.

Guaranteeing acceptable timing for the detection of an accident which seriously injured the driver and for rescue alerting.

Performance (Response time)

Suppose it has been detected that an accident involving car *car_id* has taken place and that the driver is seriously injured

Ideal Requirement:

Emergency Service alerted within maximal time *t_alert*

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-property:

 $\mathcal{P}_{\geq 0.997}(_{\top} \diamondsuit_{\{AccAssSrv: \mathbf{0}((car_id,gps), EmSrv)\}}^{< t_alert} \mathsf{tt})$

Focus on those states reached after a phone call has been placed to the driver mobile phone, and nobody has answered for a given period of time, t_answ .

Ideal Requirement:

It should never happen that the phone is ringing for t_answ time units without a \blacksquare -state being reached.

Focus on those states reached after a phone call has been placed to the driver mobile phone, and nobody has answered for a given period of time, t_answ .

Realistic Requirement:

In at most 0.2% of the cases the phone is ringing for t_answ time units without a \blacksquare -state being reached.

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Realistic Requirement:

In at most 0.2% of the cases the phone is ringing for t_answ time units without a \blacksquare -state being reached.

-property:

$$\mathcal{P}_{<0.002}(\langle PhNr(car_id) \rangle @PhSrv_{\top} \mathcal{U}^{[t_answ,t_answ]} \neg \blacksquare)$$

Consider now the situation in which an accident has been just notified.

Ideal Requirement:

A phone call is placed to the driver mobile phone with a delay of at most t_call time units, bringing to a state.

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Acceptable Behaviour

REQUIREMENT:

Ideal Requirement:

The system does not behave *unacceptably*, after an accident has been notified.

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The probability that the system behaves *unacceptably*, after an accident has been notified, is less than 0.004.

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Periodic testing the system with fake accident notifications

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Liveness of diagnostic routines:

$$\mathcal{P}_{\geq 1}(\mathsf{T} \square \mathcal{P}_{\geq 1}(\mathsf{T} \land \mathsf{AccAssSrv}: \mathbf{O}((\mathsf{TEST_ID}, \mathsf{TEST_GPS}, \mathsf{TEST_SD}), \mathsf{AccAssSrv}) \mathsf{tt}))$$



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Image: Image:

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 $S_{>0.99}(\neg(\langle FAULT \rangle @AccAssSrv))$

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- $\mathcal{U}^{[t,t']}$ generalises $\mathcal{U}^{< t}$
- model-checking $\mathcal{P}_{\bowtie p}(\varphi)$ automatically returns also $\mathbb{P}(\{\pi \mid \pi \models \varphi \text{ and } \pi \text{ from } s\})$ for all states *s*.

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 SAM Model Checker : Implementation of a model-checking algorithm for full MoSL which uses CSL model-checkers (MRMC) SAM Model Checker : Implementation of a model-checking algorithm for full MoSL which uses CSL model-checkers (MRMC)

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 - StoKLAIM uIMC semantics plus CTMDP model-checking.

SAM Model Checker

- StoKlaim simulation and reachability graph generation.
- StoKLAIM \models MoSL verification
- implemented in OCaML
 - OCaML provides mechanisms for interoperability with the C language
 - these primitives are used for interacting with MRMC (computing *steady* and *path* probabilities)
- The tool is still at a prototype level
 - $\bullet\,$ systems with about 10^6 states can be handled

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